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We examine transparency-related characteristics of European and US sovereign bond 
markets and relate these to differences in primary issuance approaches and the design 
of the different trading platforms.  We highlight the existence of a winner’s curse 
problem in the interaction between B2C and B2B segments of the market, and we 
provide evidence to analyze its prevalence.  We examine the problems that can arise 
as the result of increasing the transparency of the B2B segment of the market and use 
the experience of the eSpeed platform in the US to obtain insights into these effects.    
Our analysis is directly relevant to the policy debate about whether to apply MiFID 
transparency requirements to the EU sovereign bond markets: our results suggest 
great caution in creating an extremely homogenous and transparent trading 
environment for sovereign bonds. 




The EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) requires greater 
transparency in equity markets and stipulates that the European Commission examine 
whether to implement similar measures in bond markets.  We investigate here the 
causes and effect of cross-country (as well as cross-trading platform) differences in 
the level of transparency in sovereign bond markets.  Few studies have tried to assess 
empirically the possible consequences for sovereign bond markets of the level of 
transparency, the effects of primary dealer obligations and the issuance techniques 
chosen by sovereign issuers.  We find that the primary issuance techniques used in the 
Euro-denominated sovereign bond market explains much of the cross country 
differences in transparency, trading costs, depth and other market quality measures.   
 
We also find evidence to suggest that the current market structure suffers from a 
winner’s curse problem arising from the increasingly electronic nature of dealer-to-
customer (B2C) and inter-dealer (B2B) trading environments.  This arises because 
customers are increasingly able to request quotes from a relatively large number of 
dealers simultaneously.  This affects the risks faced by dealers in their attempts to 
hedge positions in the inter-dealer market once they have acquired positions following 
their dealings with buy-side customers.   
 
Finally, from an analysis of increased transparency of the eSpeed platform in the US 
Treasury market, we find that there is a potential price to be paid for excessive 
transparency of the inter-dealer limit order book and post-trade information.  This 
arises because customers are likely to reduce communication with dealers regarding 
their potential demands if they can already see inter-dealer prices and limit-orders.  
Dealers therefore are likely to reduce the provision of limit prices and their limit 
orders are likely to be less informed on average. 
 
Most theoretical and empirical work on the effects of transparency has been on equity 
markets and corporate/municipal bond markets (e.g., Edwards et al. 2004).  These 
markets differ in many ways from the sovereign bond market.  Gravelle (2000) and 
Martinez-Rezano (2005) identify some of the most obvious differences.  For example,   2
equity markets operate in the context of significant asymmetry in information 
regarding the actual cash flows arising from operations. This is not true of sovereign 
bond markets.  Another major difference is the fact that bonds have a finite life and 
are more likely to be held for the long run.  The size of sovereign issues also marks 
them out as different and the consequent risk positions taken by dealers providing 
liquidity are usually greater than in equity markets.   
 
Both the theoretical and the empirical literature to date have mixed conclusions on the 
benefits or otherwise of transparency. The main theme is that infrequent large traders 
would prefer (or would obtain better execution quality on) opaque settings and more 
standard sized trades would obtain better service from markets arranged around 
transparent limit-order books. The degree of asymmetry in information regarding the 
actual cash flows of asset being traded significantly favours more transparency. 
Transparency can also raise the risks borne by dealers in markets where large, 
infrequent trades are the norm and where noise trades are not present in enough 
numbers. But less transparent ‘competitive dealership markets’ may benefit 
participants of any type when there is significant competition for order flow (Naik, et 
al., 1999). 
 
Recently, Swan and Westerholm (2004) and Aitken et al. (2006) both consider the 
execution quality of different international equity markets in a multivariate regression 
approach. The latter authors used a matched pair methodology and consider a small 
number of exchanges but have more comprehensive coverage of thinly traded stocks, 
with more diverse explanatory variables. In particular they use v arious market 
attributes, including transparency within the B2B segment of the market and between 
the B2B and the B2C, as explanatory variables. They find that full transparency of the 
limit-order book within the B2B space reduces effective spreads, but transparency 
beyond this, to include the B2C segment, or to all investors, is associated with larger 
effective spreads. This is an interesting finding considering that our empirical work 
(below) also finds that a transparency increase to all investors in the eSpeed case leads 
to higher spreads (at least for a significant period of time). 
  
Other studies that consider the effect of market design differences on execution costs 
with special consideration for thinly traded stocks are by Muscarella and Piwowar   3
(2001) and Nimalendran and Petrella (2003). The first paper finds that the liquidity of 
infrequently traded stocks suffers from a move from periodic call to continuous 
trading. Lai (2004) also found that execution costs rose for stocks on the LSE Mid-
250 when there was a change from a pure dealer market to a hybrid arrangement 
involving a limit-order book and specialist.  This might reflect effects similar to those 
we discuss in our analysis such as the winner’s curse that arises because of the 
interaction between B2C and B2B markets. 
 
There is a significant difference between equity and sovereign bond markets that is 
not addressed by Gravelle (and not reflected in the equity market research more 
generally) and is particularly relevant to the European sovereign bond market. It 
arises due to the relationship between the primary issuers and the primary dealers, 
who provide most of the liquidity in the secondary market (as well as distribution 
services in the primary market).  Sovereign bond issuers are effectively monopsonistic 
demanders of liquidity services due to their very large issues and the frequency with 
which they roll-over debt.  Sovereign issuers depend on primary dealers to take up 
large risky positions in primary auctions and require them to maintain a  strong 
presence in a secondary market which is often illiquid.  The theoretical analysis of 
this market structure (see Dunne et al 2006) implies that issuers use their 
monopsonistic power to increase liquidity in the secondary market for their issues 
while at the same time increasing the transparency of the market (since dealer 
obligations apply to transparent markets where dealer activity can be monitored).   
 
This provides benefits for the issuers because their bonds are more attractive for buy-
side participants and they obtain a premium for this at the issuance stage.  By 
imposing primary market obligations on dealers a further improvement can be 
obtained by the issuer at the issuance stage (primary dealers are frequently required to 
participate in a significant way in primary auctions).  The dealers’ secondary market 
obligations are quite diffuse, sometimes across hundreds of bonds with very similar 
characteristics.  Moreover, spreads in the secondary market are sufficiently tight that 
it is not very profitable, if at all. It is plausible to conclude that this activity is a loss 
leader for Primary dealers.  They accept a poor return on their primary (and perhaps 
even their secondary market activity) in the expectation that they will obtain 
privileges such as access to recently issued stock at preferential prices, lead   4
managership in syndications and even preferential status in the award of privatisation 
mandates. 
 
In this study we focus on the differences across issuers according to their management 
of issuance.  Our empirical analysis relies on statistical comparisons across existing 
sovereign bond markets where differences in transparency, issuance techniques and 
other factors are well known.  Our analysis covers most of the markets of the MTS 
inter-dealer space.  We also rely on comparisons across maturities by benchmark 
status, and we compare the European experience with that of the US Treasury market, 
where recent developments have led to the co-existence of three major competing 
trading platforms.  To ensure the relevance of our analysis in a constantly changing 
environment, we have selected high quality data that is of very recent vintage for our 
cross-market, cross-sector and cross-benchmark-status analysis.   
 
We have supplemented this analysis with an examination of developments over recent 
years and also with the examination of a ‘transparency event’ that took place in the 
US Treasury market in June 2003.  We discuss the possible effects of the proposed 
increase of pre-trade transparency of orderbooks in the MiFID directive to include the 
best three prices on either side of the book.  We use the experience of the eSpeed 
transparency change in the US Treasury market to show that even small changes in 
the distribution of pre-trade information can have noticeable effects.  We argue that 
this change could result in a reduction in pre-trade requests for quotes and therefore 
affect the information that dealers obtain from the B2C segment of the market.  This 
leads us to suggest that implementation of MiFID  in the sovereign bond markets, 
while increasing the recycling of information between the B2B and B2C segments, 
could reduce the equilibrium amount of trading and limit-order provision in the 
market.  In this case liquidity may decline and available best execution also.  The 
alternative outcome is also possible, assuming transparency is not already at its 
optimal level. Regulators should therefore be very cautious about intervention. 
 
The paper proceeds with a discussion of the well-known differences within and across 
MTS and US markets/platforms. We relate these to the various issuance techniques 
and the obligations that are often imposed on primary dealers.  We follow this with a 
discussion of the datasets we use.  We then outline the empirical approaches we use to   5
obtain interesting and robust measures of the effects of transparency, issuance 
techniques and primary dealer obligations. 
 
II.  Differences within and across MTS and US markets/platforms 
 
In general terms, all of the markets we analyze below have become increasingly 
transparent in recent years, due to the increasing use of electronic trading platforms 
for B2B business and, to a lesser extent, the automation of request-for-quote trading 
in the B2C space.  In the euro-denominated sovereign bond market the MTS platform 
has improved the availability of pre- and post-trade information and this information, 
is made available outside of the B2B space in real-time.  MTS provides real-time 
quotes and the last transaction price in all of the benchmark bonds on the platform via 
Bloomberg and Reuters.  In November 2004 the entire range of MTS data was made 
available in real-time through Traderforce©.
1  Although these data are comprehensive 
and widely available at low incremental cost for professional investors, their 
availability does not imply that all parts of the euro-denominated markets are 
perfectly (or similarly) pre- and post-trade transparent.   
 
The increasing transparency of the MTS market may have come at some cost.  For 
many countries it has been necessary to encourage primary dealers to participate fully 
in this transparent market place.  Encouragement has been in the form of payoffs from 
primary issuance business.  This has distorted yields at primary auctions.  Where 
secondary obligations are not i mposed on primary dealers we expect to find less 
activity on the transparent market.  We show that there is a lot of variability across 
countries with regard to the amount of activity that takes place on MTS.  Most of it, if 
not all, can be explained with  reference to the issuance techniques of the various 
issuers and their reliance on primary dealer obligations that extend to the secondary 
market.   
 
Without secondary market obligations, our priors tell us that activity would drift to 
opaque trading venues.  This is usually viewed negatively, because it fragments the 
market place, reduces the liquidity available in any one venue and of course reduces 
                                                 
1 See the press release at http://www.mtsgroup.org/newcontent/news/d_new/2004_11_02.shtml   6
the transparency of the market for those not directly involved.  It does have the 
advantage, however, that it allows for the build-up of trust between trading partners in 
their regular and repeated dealings.  This reduces information asymmetry as well as 
the winner’s curse problem that is a feature of anonymous request-for-quote B2C 
arrangements. 
 
To be more specific about our priors, we now outline how the countries on MTS 
differ with respect to their issuance techniques and the secondary market obligations 
they impose.  We regard Italy, Portugal, Austria, Belgium and Finland as extreme in 
their use of either syndicated issuance and/or the imposition of secondary market 
obligations on primary dealers.  We regard France and Germany as outliers on the 
other end of the issuance style spectrum.  Germany is the most extreme as it never 
issues by syndication and imposes no obligations on primary dealers.  Spain and 
Greece are special cases, because they do not impose secondary market obligations 
that are specific to the MTS platforms.  The Dutch market is somewhere between the 
two ends of the issuance style spectrum, since they do not often provide large benefits 
to primary dealers by way of syndicated issuance and do not impose secondary 
market obligations.  In the Dutch case the lead runner in syndicated issues is often the 
debt management office itself (this has been referred to as Dutch Direct Auctions).  
 
These facts appear to explain many of our empirical findings for the European case.  
Additional insights come from an analysis of the US Treasury market.  Here issuance 
is by auction, and while there is a primary dealer system, this does not extend to the 
imposition of secondary market obligations.  In this sense it is much more like the 
German bond market although it is far greater in size. Especially interesting in the US 
Treasury market is how the various alternative trading platforms compare and 
whether the comparisons can be related to differential transparency.   
 
The US Treasury market has already responded to transparency initiatives.  The 
response has affected only the already very liquid part of that market, the on-the-run 
segment.  The initial response to SEC and Treasury calls for more transparency in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s led to the GovPX initiative.  Up until its steady decline, 
which began in 2000, this transparency initiative provided consolidated best bid and 
offer prices and quantity as well as latest transaction quantity, price and type from   7
both OTC and individual inter-dealer broker trading platforms.  All but one of the 
inter-dealer brokers took part at its inception.  But more recently the number of 
contributing brokers declined until ICAP acquired the system in mid-2004 and 
became the sole contributor.   
 
Electronic trading was not a feature of the GovPX system, so it became largely 
redundant as an indicator for the on-the-run market over recent years, as eSpeed and 
BrokerTec have dominated the on-the-run space.  It is difficult to gauge how much 
the GovPX initiative improved transparency because there is little information 
available regarding how well disseminated the information was across participants (or 
how timely was its distribution).  We doubt that it ever achieved the level of 
transparency of either of the more recently developed platforms or MTS.  We 
therefore expect to find transparency - related effects, such as a tendency for l arger 
trades to be conducted on GovPX. 
 
We regard the eSpeed platform as the most transparent of the three US Treasury 
trading platforms.  Its data are much more readily available to market participants and 
are in a much more user-friendly form than data f rom the other platforms.  In 
September 2002, Cantor Market Data began to distribute a real-time data product that 
featured views of limit orders, trading stacks and last traded price for each of the five 
on-the-run UST Benchmarks.  It also revealed whether bids and offers were made up 
from multiple buyers and sellers, single or multiple substantial orders or multiple 
small orders.  Although this information was initially supplied only to Cantor 
customers, the coverage was extended in June 2003 to Reuters and in August of the 
following year to Bloomberg.  The quality of presentation of the data has improved 
over time, and it is now combined with easy-to-interpret visual effects and related 
information from the futures markets.   
 
As discussed below, eSpeed provides good quality execution for standard sized 
trades, and this has attracted a lot of buy-side participation via program-algorithmic 
trading.  Although this market is very transparent, there is high level of activity. It 
could therefore be argued that t his provides a ‘natural-veil’ effect that would 
counteract the liquidity reducing effects of transparency.  An alternative view is that 
sophisticated participants now have the computing power and means to process the   8
larger amounts of high quality information emitted from this busy platform on a real-
time basis and that the transparency of the market is fully utilized.  We expect that 
participants respond to the high level of transparency of this market by reducing trade 
size and increasing its frequency and randomness. 
 
The BrokerTec platform is not as transparent as eSpeed, but it has other qualities that 
attract activity.  Its main advantage lies in providing trading integration with the 
relevant futures markets.  It also allows for some negotiation regarding trade quantity 
(the ‘work-ups’).  This means that larger trades can be done at potentially better prices 
and quicker than on eSpeed.  The orderbook information is not as user friendly or as 
widely available as the eSpeed book information.  We expect that the relative opacity 
of the BrokerTec platform will affect characteristics of the market such as the 
incidence of front-running relating to limit orderbook changes in the seconds before 
buyer or seller initiated trades.  BrokerTec and eSpeed provide markets for the on-the-
run segment.  The off-the-run segment is still largely OTC and quite opaque by most 
accounts, and we expect this to be reflected in the analysis of GovPX spreads and 
other execution quality characteristics.  
 
Given the size of issuance and the concentration of activity, we do not expect to find 
that the on-the-run US Treasury market suffers from as many of the transparency- 
related distortions as are evident in the MTS case.  Although transparency has been 
increasing and the ability of  market participants to analyze real-time data has 
increased, we do not expect to find major effects in response to the transparency event 
that we study.  This market is so active and deep that the risk of obtaining bad 
execution is naturally low.  In fact, however, we do find some evidence to suggest that 
execution quality can be threatened by the interaction between the B2B and the B2C 
markets.  This is where the winner’s curse problem is evident, and it applies as much 
to MTS as it does to the US Treasury market. 
 
Since the two US platforms for on-the-run issues differ in terms of their transparency 
we expect better execution quality for larger trades on the less transparent market 
(BrokerTec).  GovPX should also be capable of providing opacity to larger trades in 
the on-the-run market.  In off-the-run segment, GovPX has the advantage of both 
liquidity and opacity and it should therefore provide better execution for larger trades   9
there (the trading on this platform can still be regarded as being of the OTC/hybrid 
variety).  However, since the ‘effective opacity’ of the US Treasury market could be 
due to network externalities (or the natural veil effect), we are open to the possibility 
that execution quality will be damaged by the lack of such externalities arising from 
the smaller amount of activity taking place in the off-the-run segment. 
 
III.  Datasets used in the analysis 
 
The datasets that we have employed in this study are very large, and in some cases 
they possess very complex structures.  We are fortunate to have access to detailed 
data for the limit orderbook and transactions from the MTS trading platforms 
covering a number of years (we use selected months from 2003, 2004 and 2005) and 
almost all sectors of the euro-denominated sovereign bond market.  The ICMA Centre 
at Reading have been instrumental in compiling a very clean reconstruction of the 
time-stamped best three limit-order prices and quantities on an event change basis 
(except when this exceeds reasonable frequency and storage capacity in which case 
recording defaults to a second-by-second basis).  Regardless of the dataset under 
consideration, we look only at the state of the orderbook immediately before each 
recorded transaction.  Where we consider the pre-trade changes in the orderbook, 
these changes are usually in the few seconds before the trade.  The transactions part of 
the MTS data provides time-stamped transactions records including price, quantity 
and a transaction initiation flag indicating whether the trade was aggressive on the 
buy or sell side of the market. 
 
The other datasets that we employ are from the US Treasury markets.   The data we 
have obtained from Cantor Market Data contain only records relating to ‘on-the-run’ 
Treasuries.  These eSpeed data come in two different forms.  One form provides time-
stamped records of transactions and covers an extended period starting in the late 
1990s (we focus on the years from 2002 onwards).  This also includes quantity traded 
and the identity of the aggressive side of each trade. We use this to provide an insight 
into trading costs, size of trade and volume over time.   
 
The second dataset from Cantor Market Data is an event-by-event dataset that 
contains the best six prices and quantities on each side of the eSpeed limit-orderbook   10
at the times of all/any changes in market information.  This is a more detailed dataset 
and is available only for selected months in the year starting October 2004.  We use 
the first three prices and quantities on each side of the orderbook to compare with 
MTS and other data.  We also use the period of overlap between the two Cantor 
datasets to check our conclusions based on the analysis of the transactions database 
alone (i.e., in the periods when the full orderbook data were unavailable). 
 
The next dataset that w e employ from the US Treasury market relates to the 
BrokerTec electronic platform for on-the-run US Treasuries.  Only a small amount of 
these data was provided to us by the inter-dealer broking firm, ICAP.  Specifically, 
we have event-by-event data from July 2003 and July 2004.  We have used these data 
to reconstruct the state of the limit orderbook immediately prior to about 60% of all 
trades that occurred on the platform in these two months.  Once again we focus on the 
best three prices and quantities on  each side of the limit orderbook at each of the 
transaction times.  We have been able to assess the overall incidence of trading and 
statistics on trade size, etc., based on  all of the recorded transactions.  
 
We also acquired data from the GovPX trading information database that covers a 
significant proportion of inter-dealer trading activity in the ‘off-the-run’ category of 
the US Treasury market.  As mentioned earlier, this dataset was developed in 
response to calls for increased transparency in the Treasury market in the early 1990s 
and has been in existence since mid-1992.  A detailed description of this dataset as it 
was in the late 1990s and the first part of the year 2000 is provided by Fleming 
(2003).  Until recently the GovPX dataset consolidated data from all of the main inter-
dealer brokers except Cantor.  Since mid-2004 it contains only information on ICAP 
quotes and trades, and this does not include ICAP’s BrokerTec business.  
 
As described by Fleming (2003), this dataset is not entirely reliable. The main 
problem is that it does not isolate different kinds of market events from each other in a 
clear enough manner (transactions, work-ups, changes to quotes, indicative prices and 
quantities and other events, some not shown on the database, all cause up-dating of 
the dataset, and this gives rise to an identification problem).  Despite the presence of 
repetitions of records, we are confident that the measures we extract from the database 
are meaningful.  What is most interesting from our point of view  that this dataset   11
reveals interesting information about the off-the-run and opaque parts of the US 
Treasury market.  We employ this dataset only to obtain information about trading 
costs, transaction size and liquidity at the best bid and ask quotes (it does not give 
information about the limit orderbook away from best prices).  For these measures, 
the problem of the repetition of records is not serious, so long as such repetitions are 
evenly distributed. When we compare these measures with those of the other US 
Treasury markets they appear entirely plausible. 
 
   12
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
In our empirical analysis we have opted to concentrate on simple (mainly non-
parametric) descriptive statistics.  As often as possible we present summary statistics 
in the form of Median, 1
st and 3
rd Quartiles.  This ensures that our statistics are free 
from undue influence from extreme outliers and from the effects of obvious non-
symmetry in the distributions of measures such as bid-ask spreads and the frequency 
or amounts of trade.  We also use an analysis of the proportions of the joint 
occurrences of outlying observations/characteristics.  This turns out to be particularly 
revealing in the analysis of ‘best-execution’.  It is also useful in shedding light on the 
issue of ‘front-running’ as well as on the prevalence of a ‘winner’s curse’ problem in 
the B2B market, which we suggest may be worsening due to the increasing 
automation and transparency of B2C request-for-quote platforms.  Similar results 
occur repeatedly across the different market characteristics, across the different ways 
we examine the issues, across the different countries, different market segments and 
different time periods that we analyse.  We believe that the pattern of results carries 
more weight than any of the most significant individual results.  We find a reassuring 
correspondence in our results with our priors and on what we have learnt from 
extensive interviews with market participants. 
  
Our empirical evidence is presented and discussed below within five main categories.  
These are (1) an analysis of turnover relative to amounts issued, (2) an analysis of 
liquidity provision, (3) an analysis of execution quality, (4) an analysis of winner’s 
curse and/or front running and (5) an analysis of the transparency event on the eSpeed 
platform. The tables/figures associated with these categories are numbered from 1 to 
5.  In our discussions we provide an explanation of the empirical techniques used and 
an explanation of what they are designed to reveal.  We also interpret the results and 
provide our conclusions. 
 
IV (1) Turnover on MTS relative to outstanding issues 
 
The amounts outstanding of specific benchmark bonds by country together with the 
associated volume traded on MTS are presented in Tables 1.2 to 1.12.  The amounts   13
outstanding are taken from the MTS Handbook
2.  Quite apart from the relative share 
of activity that takes place on electronic venues, transparency is likely to be a much 
more important factor when the overall size of the outstanding stock in active 
portfolios is small.  In this respect Table 1.1 and the tables that follow also reveal that 
there is a very significant difference between the largest three issuers and all of the 
others in the euro-denominated sovereign market.  It is also the case that the largest of 
the euro-denominated sovereign markets is much smaller than the US Treasury 
market in terms of both outstanding issues and turnover.  We estimate that the 
monthly turnover of the 10 year US Treasury is about 18 times as great as the 
turnover in Italian Benchmark Bonds at the same maturity.  In terms of trading 
frequency the difference is even greater since US Treasury transaction sizes are on 
average much smaller (regardless of venue) than those on the MTS platform.  In this 
respect we conclude that activity and the inventory positions of dealers are much 
easier to track in the European sovereign market.  We expect that the thinner ‘natural 
veil’ provided by the less crowded and less complex market place increases the 
sensitivity to transparency in the European context.   
 
Monthly volume traded on MTS for specific issues was derived from a summing up 
of all the relevant transactions recorded on the MTS database for the same month as 
the outstanding amounts were recorded.  There is a wide variation in the percentage 
turnover on MTS, with the largest percentages occurring for Italy, Portugal, Belgium 
and Finland.  The MTS turnover percentage is low for France and Germany, and the 
other countries are in the middle range.  Greece is a special case since it has its own 
dedicated platform, HDAT, on which much of the remaining turnover occurs.  
Spanish volume is also divided between the MTS and Senaf platforms.   Italy’s 
percentage is high.  This is not surprising given that the MTS system originated from 
the efforts of the Italian Treasury to increase the liquidity of the Italian market.  It is 
still the case that secondary market obligations of primary dealers in the Italian bond 
market are specific to the MTS platform and exceed most of those imposed elsewhere 
in Europe. The effects of the primary dealer obligations combine with the network 
externalities that stem from the large overall issuance of Italian sovereign bonds to 
produce what is measurably the most liquid of the European sovereign bond markets. 
                                                 
2 MTS Group (2005), The European Government Bond Market: A Single Market with 
Unique Segments, Edition II.   14
  
Given its significant presence on the MTS system we regard the Italian market as a 
close substitute for a natural experiment capable of revealing the effects of the MiFID 
proposals if OTC trading were forced onto transparent settings. Since Italian activity 
is generally concentrated on the MTS platform, it provides a special case from which 
to view this possibility.  A post-MiFID environment would, in many respects, be 
comparable to what currently exists in the Italian MTS.
3  Consolidation might 
improve liquidity by way of a network externality.  To assess whether this is a likely 
outcome from MiFID transparency requirements, we consider comparisons of the 
Italian turnover with that of the French and Portuguese.   
 
The outstanding amounts issued of individual Italian BTPs are roughly equal to the 
outstanding amounts issued of individual French BTANs and OATs.  We estimate 
that MTS Trading volume in BTANs and OATs is roughly half the total trading 
volume associated with these issues.  But even  doubling  the MTS trading volumes 
for any of the French issues given in Table 1.5 would still leave them much lower 
than trading volumes shown for Italian issues of similar size.  This is tentative 
evidence implying that the ‘natural-veil’ effect raises liquidity in the Italian market 
more than proportionately.  It should be stressed, however, that most of the MTS 
markets (excluding Germany, France and Spain) have individual issue sizes that are 
roughly half those of individual Italian issues, so they may never acquire significant 
network externalities.   
 
The Portuguese case is also interesting from this perspective.  The secondary market 
obligations in Portugal are not very different from those in Italy but Portuguese issues 
are much smaller than the Italian.  Despite the small issue size the Portuguese 
turnover percentage is often much higher than the Italian (Table 1.11. shows this is 
true in two cases at the short maturity).  It would be difficult to make a network 
externality argument that could explain this, and this therefore casts doubt on the 
                                                 
3 The Portuguese market is similar to the Italian in terms of the considerable 
obligations placed on the Primary Dealer to provide liquidity at both primary and 
secondary level but it is much smaller in terms of issuance.  In our empirical analysis, 
we  use  the characteristics of this market to gain additional insights.   15
conclusion in favour of the network externality drawn from the comparison between 
the French and Italian turnovers. 
 
The broad message that one can take from even a cursory view of the turnover 
percentages presented in Tables 1.1 to 1.12 is that these can be explained by the 
differential reliance on the imposition of secondary market obligations by certain 
issuers.  Countries that rely more on syndicate issuance and the placing of secondary 
market obligations on primary dealers have higher turnover percentages on MTS.   
 
The variation in MTS turnover percentages cannot be explained by variation in the 
overall turnover percentages.  We focus on just one example where the data are 
readily available and can be verified immediately.  This is the case of France where 
the daily average turnover reported to AFT in the 5 most liquid OATs and the 4 most 
liquid BTANs was roughly 20 billion euro each (or 40 billion daily on average for 
liquid BTANs and OATs taken together).
4  Table 1.5 shows the MTS trading volume 
for the month of June 2004 for the 3 most liquid OATs and the 2 most liquid BTANs.  
Assuming 20 trading days in the month, this implies an average daily turnover on 
MTS of about 4 billion euro.  Although this is only a subset of the bonds for which 
total turnover is reported to AFT, it is still a very small fraction of that turnover.  
From this we tentatively assert that MTS turnover is likely to be less than half the 
total turnover in French sovereigns.  This leaves substantial opacity in the market and 
reduces the representativeness of the MTS prices and quotes relative to those 
available more generally in the market place.  It also reduces available liquidity on 
MTS, as we suggest below. 
 
Our theoretical model leads us to expect differences in market characteristics across 
euro-denominated sovereign markets in relation to the extent to which smaller issuers 
rely on syndications of their issues and the degree to which they depend on primary 
dealers for provision of secondary market liquidity.  While the Italian market has high 
turnover on MTS, other interesting cases in terms of MTS turnover are the 
Portuguese, Belgian and Finnish markets.  Their main common feature is their high 
dependence on syndicated issuance (Portugal 40%, Belgium 40% and Finland no less 
                                                 
4 See the monthly bulletin of the Agence France Trésor at http://www.aft.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/169en.pdf   16
than 90%)
5.  With relatively small issue sizes, these markets manage to attract a large 
proportion of total trading activity to the transparent MTS market, but much of this is 
related to the obligations placed upon primary dealers who are keen to participate in 
primary issuance.  In the Portuguese case primary dealers must also be involved in at 
least 2% of the secondary market turnover in specific benchmark issues.  Similarly, 
Finnish and Belgian issuers rely on a primary dealer system to ensure secondary 
market liquidity.  Participation in the secondary market is a factor used in selection of 
lead distributors.   
 
In the case of Germany, there is no reliance on a primary dealer system and also no 
syndicated issues.  As expected, .this affects the willingness of dealers to participate 
in the transparent secondary market.  This is reflected in the relatively small 
proportion of trade in German issues occurring on the MTS trading platform (Table 
1.6).  This is tentative evidence that Germany relies on an opaque secondary market to 
ensure that primary dealers are prepared to provide liquidity at auctions.  It is 
plausible that MiFID transparency proposals if implemented would drive German 
issuance policy towards the type of approach taken by many of the smaller issuers.  
The same conclusion can be drawn for France, where there is very little syndication  
and where primary dealers are not required to participate in the secondary market.  
Here again, activity on MTS is v ery low (see Table 1.5).  For markets in which 
syndication and secondary market obligation are prevalent, it appears that more 
transparency can  be obtained only by distorting other market characteristics.  The 
obligations placed on primary dealers act as a disciplining device that effectively 
substitutes for the benefits that primary dealers would normally obtain under less 
transparent settings (or in markets where sufficient activity provides ‘natural-veil’ 
type network externalities).   
 
The analysis of the share of turnover on MTS makes it clear that it relates directly to 
secondary market obligations or to the reliance of the relevant issuer on the 
syndication approach to issuance.  When these factors are absent, as in the German 
case, MTS is not the chosen venue for activity, and the issuer has not opted to 
                                                 
5 Source, Presentation by Lars Boman, Nov 2003, Swedish National Debt Office; 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/4/29172097.pdf  This presentation also highlights 
some of the disadvantages of the syndicated issuance approach.   17
encourage a move of activity to the transparent venue.  The benefits that accrue to the 
German issuer from allowing its bonds to be traded in a more opaque setting are 
obtained by way of a less distorted primary auction system.  Although opacity may be 
associated with less liquidity and a liquidity premium this does not appear to have 
affected German sovereigns greatly.  Much the same conclusion applies to the French 
case.  These conclusions are broadly supported by the analysis of other market-quality 
related analysis to which we now turn. 
 
IV (2) An analysis of liquidity 
 
Tables 2.1 to 2.4 provide results from the analysis of five liquidity-related variables 
for the MTS and US trading platforms by maturity and benchmark status.  The 
variables calculated are the effective spread, the steepness of the orderbook, the trade 
size, the liquidity available at the best bid and ask quotes and the liquidity available in 
the best three quotes.  Details of exactly how these measures are derived are provided 
in the notes accompanying the tables.  In each case the median is provided along with 
the 1
st and 3
rd quartiles.  Another liquidity measure that is not calculated here is the 
speed with which limit order quantities are replenished.  In the case of the MTS 
platform this is usually instantaneous because of the use of hidden ‘block-quantities’ 
that feed automatically into the visible ‘drip-quantity’ as soon as existing limit order 
is hit or taken.  A slow speed of  replenishment would be expected to show up in 
various ways in the other liquidity measures that we present, however, so we do not 
specifically consider this attribute separately. 
 
The effective spreads rise with term to maturity.  Effective spreads are not necessarily 
higher for the non-benchmark issues at each maturity, as one might expect.  This can 
be explained by the fact that off-the-run issues will have moved closer to their 
redemption date and will therefore have shorter terms to maturity than those that have 
been recently issued.  This is particularly relevant at the short maturity where the off-
the-runs are quite close to redemption.  For this reason, comparisons between 
benchmarks and their non-benchmark counterparts are not always valid.  It is also 
advisable not to read too much into small differences in effective spreads even within 
benchmark categories as this could be explained by differences in term to maturity.    18
Notwithstanding these reservations, there are some quite large differences that are 
unlikely to be explained by maturity differences.  
 
Table 2.1. Panel A:  Consider the results for the short maturity benchmarks presented 
in this table.  It is interesting that all of the MTS country-related effective spreads are 
zero at the first quartile.  For the Italian and Spanish markets there is a zero effective 
cost of trading for up to 50% of all trades at this maturity.  The Netherlands, France 
and Germany all have slightly higher median effective spreads than other countries.  
This is broadly supportive of the view that these countries have less reliance on the 
MTS system and that best execution is regularly found on alternative trading venues.  
This view is further supported by the relatively small effective spread and plentiful 
liquidity found for the Finnish market in which issue size is seldom much greater than 
the minimum required.  This can therefore be explained by the high dependence of 
Finland on the syndicated issuance approach and how this affects primary dealer 
participation on the transparent MTS. 
 
There is little doubt that median effective spreads in the US Treasury market are 
significantly below those available on MTS.  But there are interesting differences 
between the three US platforms.  The most transparent and most liquid platform 
(eSpeed) has low effective spreads at the median and 1
st quartile but not at the 3
rd 
quartile.  This is consistent with the view that a transparent setting will not provide 
small effective spreads for larger than usual trade size.  By contrast, the BrokerTec 
platform provides a very stable effective spread which is roughly three quarters of a 
basis point for at least 75% of trades.  Surprisingly, the GovPX effective spread is 
only marginally different from that which is available on the other two platforms 
(despite its minor share of the on-the-run market). 
 
At the short maturity the comparison of orderbook steepness in conjunction with the 
liquidity variables reveals some interesting facts.  The Netherlands appears to have a 
book with lower than average median steepness but also less overall available 
liquidity.  Steepness on the MTS compares very well with that on the very liquid 
eSpeed system in the US. But this should be viewed in the knowledge that the 
available liquidity in the slightly steeper eSpeed orderbook is usually more than twice 
as great as that on any individual MTS market.  BrokerTec also provides a market in   19
which the orderbook is less steep than on eSpeed but it also has about one-fifth the 
available liquidity.  Smaller trades (5 Million euro/US dollar) are more likely on the 
Italian market as well as on all of the US Treasury platforms.  This is consistent with 
the increased splitting-up of large orders in more transparent and consolidated 
markets and also the use of algorithmic automated trade execution in the case of the 
US Treasury market.  GovPX and eSpeed both have larger than average 3
rd quartile 
trade size but we note that the 3
rd quartile effective spread is much greater on eSpeed 
than on GovPX or BrokerTec.  It must be the case that eSpeed is the sometimes the 
choice of venue for large trades when the impact of such trades is visible (i.e., the 
trader knows in advance how far up the orderbook the trade will go and this is likely 
to be when there is more visible depth and when there is uncertainty as to what price 
impact will occur on other venues).  In the case of GovPX, the incidence of large 
trade size at the 3
rd quartile can be explained by the frequency with which traders 
negotiate ‘work-ups’ and the fact that these work-ups are afforded a significant degree 
of opacity.  It may be the case that this is occurring when visible depth is lower than 
average on eSpeed, but this is something we have not explored. 
 
Liquidity at the best quotes and the liquidity available in the best three quotes provide 
a broadly similar picture of the cross-country MTS landscape.  Specifically, German, 
French and Dutch liquidity provision is lower than elsewhere and, at least in the cases 
of France and Germany, this reflects the lack of primary dealer obligations relating to 
secondary market participation on MTS.  Liquidity on US treasury markets is 
characterised by a significantly deeper situation on the eSpeed platform than on 
BrokerTec. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.1. contains similar measures for the non-benchmark segment of 
the short maturity market.  These measures provide a picture similar to that just 
discussed for the benchmark segment.  The most significant points of interest include 
(i) a relatively small trade size in the market for Italian issues (only 2.5 million euro 
for the entire interquartile range), (ii) the Spanish MTS market has a large effective 
spread that might indicate that the Senaf is where best execution occurs, and (iii) the 
GovPX effective spread is significantly smaller than the equivalent spread in the 
benchmark segment of the same market.  The smaller GovPX spread in the non-
benchmark segment of the US Treasury market is unlikely to be due to term-to-  20
maturity differences.  It is also clear from the liquidity characteristics that the non-
benchmark Treasury market is less liquid than the benchmark segment, so this is also 
not an explanation for the effective spread difference.  The only plausible explanation 
is the relatively opaque nature of the GovPX market. 
 
The results just discussed for the short maturity are largely repeated for the other 
maturities.  It is nevertheless worth mentioning the main findings from these 
maturities.  The medium maturity benchmark case is given in Table 2.2., Panel A.  
We note that the effective spreads do not vary much across the MTS markets.  The 
effective spreads available in the US Treasury market at this maturity are much lower 
than in the MTS market. The German and Dutch total liquidity provision is lower than 
elsewhere.  The Finnish market once again has a surprisingly low effective spread and 
unusually good liquidity for a small issuer.  In the medium non-benchmark case 
shown in Table 2.2., Panel B the effective spread and steepness of the orderbook are 
relatively high for Germany and France and total liquidity is relatively low.  Trade 
size is relatively small for Italy and for the US markets.   
 
The long maturity results in Table 2.3. give rise to a similar set of conclusions, but in 
this case the US-European comparison is of particular interest.   For the long 
benchmarks in Panel A we observe a large median French effective spread and total 
liquidity is reliably smaller for both the French and German cases when compared 
with other European countries.  The Finnish and Italian markets have low effective 
spreads and liquidity is unusually large for the Finnish case given its issuance size.  
On the US Treasury market BrokerTec provides better effective spreads than the other 
two platforms and smaller median and 3
rd quartile effective spreads than available on 
MTS.  The eSpeed platform is surprisingly poor at this maturity and is generally not 
as high quality as the various MTS markets.  The MTS platform also looks good in 
terms of orderbook steepness.  The MTS country-specific orderbooks are flatter than 
both the eSpeed and BrokerTec orderbooks.  Total liquidity provision is also better on 
MTS, but trade size might explain the need for this. Trade size is much smaller in the 
US Treasury market, which is likely to be related either  to algorithmic trading or to 
the practice of breaking up large trades so as to hide positions in an excessively 
transparent market.  The long maturity non-benchmark results are not comprehensive 
enough in their country coverage to permit definitive conclusions.  It is worth   21
mentioning however that Italian and US trade size are again smaller than elsewhere 
which is what would be expected in transparent markets. 
 
The results for the very long maturity benchmarks in Panel A of Table 2.4 once again 
show that German and Dutch effective spreads are high.  In this maturity bracket there 
is not as much support for earlier findings, but this is probably due to the overall 
illiquidity of this segment.  Total liquidity provision is much smaller for all countries 
at this maturity.  Trade size is generally smaller for the MTS platforms than at other 
maturities, but it is relatively high in terms of the liquidity available at best quotes.  
While the US Treasury market is just as illiquid as the MTS platforms at this maturity, 
the effective spreads are much lower there.  The non-benchmark measures presented 
in Panel B of the same table show relatively small effective spreads in the Italian 
market and otherwise provide no clear-cut conclusions. 
 
In summary, the analysis of effective spreads, trade size and liquidity provision above 
is broadly what would have been expected give in the light of theory and the facts 
about issuance approaches and primary dealer obligations. We can summarise the 
findings as follows.  Where transparency is very high, trade size tends to fall.  We 
found this for Italy and the two electronic trading spaces in the US Treasury market.  
Where primary dealer obligations are greatest or where syndicated issuance is used 
heavily, we see better participation/liquidity provision on MTS and artificially small 
effective spreads.  We found this for Finland and Italy.  We found that MTS was not 
very liquid, however, for the Netherlands, Germany and France where issuance is 
seldom or never by syndication and where no obligations are imposed on primary 
dealers to participate in MTS.  In the US effective spreads are generally smaller than 
on MTS but the long benchmark case shows a surprisingly competitive MTS. 
 
IV (3) Execution quality 
 
In Tables 3.1 to 3.3 we present an analysis of execution quality just for the benchmark 
issues at the short, medium and long maturities (primary dealer obligations usually 
apply to the benchmarks).  This is an extended analysis of the liquidity conditions in 
the market surrounding trades that had poor execution quality as measured by the 
effective spread.  We analyze how trade size interacts with execution quality.  We   22
also examine what proportion of poorly executed trades coincide with low liquidity at 
the best quotes and with a steep orderbook.  These proportions vary quite a lot across 
the different countries and trading platforms.  Cross-market comparisons give insights 
into the effects of issuance technique, primary dealer obligations and other 
transparency considerations and confirm much of the evidence already discernible 
from the liquidity measures themselves. 
 
At the short maturity shown in Table 3.1., we note that poor execution quality is not 
always strongly associated with large trade size when these attributes are defined in 
relation to their own country/platform distributions.  To interpret the statistics 
presented in this table, it is necessary to recall the size of the 3
rd quartiles for the 
effective spread associated with each country/platform and for the other attribute that 
is being considered.  For example, the GovPX market has a very high proportion of 
trades that are defined as both poorly executed and large in size.  But, the effective 
spread at the 3
rd quartile for this market was quite low and was the same as the 
median and 1
st quartile (Table 2.1 shows it to be 0.79), so this result is not that 
surprising.  In other words, what is defined as poor execution quality for this market 
may not be very different from the execution quality obtained at the median or even 
the 1
st quartile.   
 
Although this makes cross-country comparisons difficult, it is usually possible to 
compare each result with at least one other country or platform for which the liquidity 
conditions are similar.  For example, the BrokerTec effective spread at the 3
rd quartile 
is roughly equal to that of GovPX, yet it has far fewer large trades that obtain poor 
execution quality.  Once again, however, caution is required, since the trade size 
quartiles are not equal.  Table 2.1. shows that the 3
rd quartile trade size on GovPX is 
twice as large as that on BrokerTec.  Trades defined as large on GovPX are therefore 
much larger than those defined as large on BrokerTec.  If size and poor execution 
quality are related then the much larger trades on GovPX will naturally have a greater 
likelihood of obtaining poor execution quality and this would explain the high 
proportion of trades being classified in the poor-execution/high-size category for this 
platform relative to what is found on BrokerTec.  This result is interesting because it 
implies that there are traders willing to accept poor execution quality for a significant 
proportion of their large trades on the GovPX platform despite the existence of   23
alternative platforms  in competition.  This must imply that those alternative venues 
are deliberately not chosen for such trades.  This is consistent with the view that these 
large trades are conducted on GovPX because of its opacity. 
 
Fortunately for most of the countries on  MTS the size, steepness and liquidity 
profiles are sufficiently similar that the analysis of the proportions of trades 
combining poor execution quality with either large size, low liquidity or high 
steepness are quite valid, so long as a little caution is exercised.  As shown in Table 
2.1. Panel A, the MTS markets all have reasonably similar 3
rd quartile effective 
spreads (just below 2 basis points).  Apart from Italy they also all have similar trade 
size attributes (10 million at both median and 3
rd quartile).   In Table 3.1., however, 
the proportion of trades combining large size and poor execution quality differs a lot 
across countries.  Poor execution quality seems to be most severe for large trades in 
the cases of the smallest issuers (Finland and Austria).  The Italian proportion is also 
quite high, given that large trade size is defined as trades greater than only 5 million 
euro (thus a relatively large proportion of quite small trades experience bad execution 
quality in the case of the Italian market).  Thus despite the appearance of small 
effective spreads and plenty of liquidity, these markets do not provide good quality 
service for larger trade size.  Another interpretation is that larger trades cannot easily 
be done elsewhere for these countries.   
 
In the second column of Table 3.1., we analyse the coincidence of poor execution 
quality and low liquidity at the best quotes.  The most common  proportion of trades  
with both poor quality execution and low liquidity is roughly between 7 and 9 
percent.  The outliers are therefore Finland and Italy where the proportions are much 
lower.  This is consistent with the argument that primary dealer obligations are 
binding on these markets.  Dealers are quoting reasonable size, but the effective 
spread is not always matching the appearance of high liquidity.  In the final column of 
the table the proportion of poor quality execution when the orderbook is steep is large 
for all of the usual suspects (Austria, Finland, Greece and Italy) and smallest for 
Germany, France and the Netherlands where primary dealer obligations are least 
binding and larger trades can be done by less transparent means.  On the US Treasury 
market the eSpeed platform appears to have a very low proportion of trades 
combining low quality execution with low liquidity on the orderbook.  This is   24
probably because the orderbook is so transparent on eSpeed.  As mentioned earlier, 
this is to be expected where the liquidity available is visible.  Traders will usually go 
to the less transparent venue to conduct larger trades when liquidity is visibly low on 
the transparent venue.  This comment also applies to visible steepness.  BrokerTec has 
no trades of low quality associated with the very steepest orderbook conditions.  This 
probably just reflects the fact that traders can move to other platforms when 
conditions are bad for trading on BrokerTec. 
 
Similar conclusions can be obtained from the results for the other maturities.  At the 
medium maturity shown in Table 3.2., we note that poor execution quality for large 
trade size occurs more frequently in the Finnish, Spanish  and Belgian markets.  
Although the Italian proportion is not as large as might have been expected, the 
French proportion is very low, and this is what one would have expected given earlier 
arguments.  The GovPX result is very similar to what occurred in the short maturity 
results, and this is already interpreted in the discussion of those results.  The results on 
the joint occurrence of low execution quality and low liquidity at best do not give any 
clear-cut conclusions for this maturity.  But the results for poor execution quality and 
high steepness generally confirm earlier results (apart from the German results, which 
are not what one would have expected).  Specifically, there is a high proportion of 
trades experiencing low execution quality when the orderbook is unusually steep for 
Austria, Greece and Italy. 
 
The long maturity results are also a bit inconclusive, but we take some comfort from 
the fact that the largest outlier in column 1 of Table 3.3., is for Spain while the 
smallest proportion occurs for Germany.  In the case of poor execution quality with 
low liquidity at best quotes (column two of Table 3.3.), Austria, Finland and Portugal 
are all outliers with small proportions of trades in this category.  Italy is also a severe 
outlier in the last column where poor execution quality and high steepness of the 
orderbook coincide for 16% of trades.  We doubt whether such trades would have 
been conducted on this transparent venue if there had been less transparent venues 
available.  The next largest proportions in the last column are for Finland and Greece 
respectively while France, Germany and the Netherlands are all on the other end of 
the scale.  Although, there are some exceptions, the body of evidence compiled here 
gives a quite a consistent and convincing picture of how market characteristics are   25
distributed across markets.  This distribution seems related to the size of the issuer, 
the issuance techniques and the obligations that are imposed on primary dealers.  The 
US Treasury market results can be explained by the differential design of the three 
platforms.  Opacity is sometimes chosen for the larger trades. 
 
IV (4) Front-running and the winner’s curse. 
 
Tables 4.1 to 4.6 show the relationship between seller- or buyer-initiated trading and 
the changes in the available liquidity on the limit orderbook immediately prior to the 
trades.  It is important to note that what is being examined here is the change in 
quantity available at the best quotes assuming no quote-price change in the few 
seconds before  trades (not the liquidity change in the entire period since the last 
trade).  We believe this activity has something to do with ‘front-running’ and a 
‘winner’s curse’ problem that arises when the inter-dealer participants are aware of 
large imminent or recent transactions in the B2C market. Specifically, when a number 
of dealers are involved in providing quotes to buy-side participants through a request-
for-quote system, the winner is immediately at a disadvantage because he knows that 
he gave the best quote, other dealers were not prepared to give such good quotes, and 
other dealers now know that some dealer has acquired a position that they will want to 
share  in the inter-dealer market.   
 
If a dealer wants to pre-empt the effects of B2C activity he may lodge a limit-order as 
soon as a request for quote is received on the B2C platform.  This would be a good 
strategy whether or not he expects to win the B2B business.  If he does win the buy-
side business then he has already begun a strategy to off-set the effects of the trade on 
his newly acquired inventory position.  If he does not get the  trade, then he is 
effectively front-running the trade that may occur as a result of the B2C activity.  
Alternatively, a dealer may regard a limit order quantity change as indicative of a 
desire to trade resulting from B2C activity and on the basis of this place a market 
order for immediate execution so as to front-run the limit order.  If a dealer were  
providing a quote to a customer who was regarded as well-informed and if the dealer 
did not win the trade, he may want to place a market order to reflect the limit-order 
information.  There are probably a dozen other ways to describe the possible 
responses of traders in the B2B space, relating to activity they observe in the B2C   26
space and all of these scenarios involve some pre-emptive action or immediate 
reaction in the B2B platform.  It is this pre-emptive action and almost instant reaction 
that we are interested in discovering and analyzing in Tables 4. 
 
Each table has two panels.  Panel A refers to seller initiated trades while Panel B 
refers to buyer-initiated trades.  We only consider benchmark issues at the short, 
medium and long maturities.  We consider the imbalance in the proportions of rises in 
liquidity at the best quotes on each side of the market just prior to trades of different 
type.  The second and third columns show the proportion of trades for which there are 
increases in quantity available at the best bid and offer.   If front-running is occurring 
we would expect to find more rises on the ask side than on the bid (and the opposite 
for buyer-initiated trades).  For seller-initiated trades, the last two columns consider 
the possibility that increases in the ask quantity predict the return that follows (where 
returns are defined as transaction-to-transaction returns using mid-quote price 
changes).  The same two columns for the buyer-initiated trades consider whether a 
rise in bid quantity is reflected in returns.  We would expect to see more positive than 
negative returns following rises in bid quantity and the opposite for rises in ask 
quantity if limit-orders are informative.  Broadly speaking, we find evidence that that 
some limit orders are informative.  We also find evidence that there is a winner’s 
curse arising, and that this is reflected in the case of some countries more than others. 
 
Consider the short maturity benchmark case for seller-initiated trades which is 
depicted in Table 4.1., Panel A.  We begin with the last two columns and note that in 
the majority of cases, rises in ask-size (preceding a seller-initiated trade) precede 
negative returns more often than they precede positive returns.  This implies the 
presence of information in the limit orders (and also information in the seller initiated 
trades that followed these limit-order changes).  Although this conclusion is based on 
a small percentage of trades in total, it is nevertheless consistent with priors and we 
find no instances where there is an imbalance in the other direction.  Furthermore, 
some countries have a large imbalance, but given the number of observations 
involved we are unable to find many examples where the cross-country differences 
are statistically significant. 
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The evidence of front-running or of a winner’s curse is provided in the second and 
third columns.  We expected seller-initiated trades to have been preceded more often 
by a rise in the ask size than a rise in the bid size and this occurs in most cases (8 out 
of 12 cases). In Panel B. the same analysis for buyer-initiated trades shows again that 
for the vast majority of cases positive returns are more likely after a rise in bid 
quantity.  We expect a rise in bid size to be more prevalent before buyer-initiated 
trades, and this is also shown to be the case (9 out of 12 cases and 6 that are 
statistically significant). 
 
Table 4.2 to a large extent confirms these results for the medium maturity 
benchmarks.  In most cases (8 out of 11) rises in ask size are followed by negative 
returns more often than by positive returns.  Ask size is much more likely to rise than 
bid size before seller initiated trades (8 out of 11).  Bid size, rather than ask size, is 
more likely to rise before buyer-initiated trades (7 out of 11).  At the long maturity, 
Table 4.3.shows very little evidence of informed trading.  Here the percentage of 
trades preceding return changes is very low, and there is very slight imbalance 
between the occurrences of returns of different sign.    For seller-initiated trades we 
also do not find much evidence of a winner’s curse or front-running.  For buyer -
initiated trades, there is some more evidence that a rise in bid size is more prevalent 
before a buy transaction (7 out of 11 with 4 statistically significant differences). 
 
We therefore find some evidence of a winner’s curse problem in the sovereign bond 
markets in both Europe and the US.  This is not at all surprising since the B2C market 
has been becoming more transparent over time and internalization of order flow has 
probably been declining.  We do not have strong evidence to show that these 
problems are more apparent in some markets than others but we would suspect that 
they are more prevalent in markets that are more transparent and less fragmented.  
Inevitably, the winner’s curse problem would be expected to worsen over time if the 
B2B and B2C markets become more transparent and if trading is increasingly 
centralised on a single platform. 
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IV (5) A Transparency Event 
 
The transparency event that we now consider occurred on 13 June 2003 in the context 
of the US Treasury market.  Detailed limit-orderbook information from Cantor 
Market Data became visible on Reuters to a much wider audience than previously at 
or soon after this date
6.  Although this can be considered an increase in pre-trade 
transparency, it is an event that affected only the buy-side participants directly and 
may have had indirect effects on how dealers priced in the B2C segment.  We believe 
that this transparency change is similar to one of the MiFID proposals regarding the 
visibility of the orderbook, and since it took place on a sovereign bond market it is 
likely to give insights into what could happen on European sovereign markets if the 
MiFID transparency initiative were to be applied there.  Unfortunately we do not have 
the full limit-orderbook database covering this period (it is only supplied in a  
historical database covering a period starting in October 2004).  We do however have 
detailed transactions data for this period, and we are able to calculate effective 
spreads, the incidence of transactions being conducted, and the sizes of these 
transactions.  From this we can infer some of the effects of the transparency event.   
 
If orderbook data had been available it would have been possible to examine a 
number of important issues: whether transparency affects liquidity available at best, 
whether there is an increase in willingness to exceed trade size that remains equal to 
or below available best size, whether there is a reduction in execution risk, whether 
there is  a rise in the cost of doing larger than average sized trades, and whether the 
quoted spread changes at the best prices. 
 
Since we do not possess the data to assess this we refer the reader to recent findings 
for a similar event that took place in the Sydney Futures Exchange.  This has been 
studied by Bortoli, Frino, Jarnecic and Johnstone (2006).  The change that occurred 
there was a move from disclosure of liquidity available at the best quote prices to 
disclosure of depth at the best three quote prices on each side of the book.  These 
authors provide a theoretical model based on execution risk to motivate their 
empirical approach, and they find that the transparency initiative caused a decline in 
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liquidity at the best quotes, no significant change in the effective spread and a rise in 
the proportion of market orders exceeding depth at the best quotes.  This amounted to 
a fall in execution risk because more liquidity was observable and its price was 
calculable pre-trade.  However, the reduced execution risk was achieved at a cost.  
This arose because liquidity at best declined. 
 
The Bortoli et al. approach is more appropriate to a situation where transparency 
within the interdealer segment itself changes, and therefore it is not entirely applicable 
to the transparency event considered here. In the case of the eSpeed initiative the 
interdealer part of the market was already pre-trade transparent for the participants of 
that segment of the market.  To analyze the effects of an increase in transparency that 
disseminates inter-dealer information t o buy-side participants we must consider 
changes in behaviour on the buy-side of the market that will have some knock-on 
effect in the inter-dealer space.  The main effect of this nature that is most likely to 
occur following an increase in transparency of inter-dealer limit order prices is that 
buy-side participants would request quotes from fewer dealers when preparing to 
trade than they did before the increase in transparency.  This is simply because they 
possess more information about what the quotes should look like and can make 
trading decisions without actually requesting as much pre-trade information as before.  
This of course affects the amount of information available to dealers about possible 
buy-side trading wishes, and it also affects the ability to front-run such information.  
Indeed it could reduce the winner’s curse problem.  A reduction in the winner’s curse 
problem will likely lead to a greater preparedness by dealers to quote narrower 
spreads.  Conversely, a reduction in the ability to make profits from buy-side 
orderflow information would be expected to raise risks for dealers and also their 
trading profits and therefore also the bid-ask spreads that they are willing to quote 
(this of course depends on competition within the inter-dealer market). 
 
Despite the lack of detailed information about the orderbook and spreads we attempt 
an analysis of the eSpeed transparency event using transactions data alone.  We 
estimate an effective spread based on the difference in prices obtained for buyer 
initiated transactions and seller -  initiated transactions that were in close proximity by 
time (specifically, we use the closest trades of either type so long as they are no more 
than one minute apart – most of these are fleeting moments apart).  We examine the   30
time profile of the third quartile of this effective spread measure.  We also examined 
trade size, trading volume and frequency, but we did not find significant effects 
surrounding the event, and therefore we do not present any analysis of these variables 
in what follows. 
 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2. show the time profile of daily 3
rd quartile effective spreads for the 
5 and 10 year maturities for a period which starts in April 2002 and runs through to 
August 2005.  Only the months of April, June and August are available for each year.  
The transparency initiative took place in June 2003, but most buy-side participants 
would have needed some lead time to make proper use of the newly available data.  
We therefore do not expect the effects to be visible immediately.  What we do observe 
is an increase in the 3
rd quartile effective spread just following the transparency event 
(in August of 2003).  This rise in spreads is not observable in the next observation 
which is for April 2004.  What is interesting in the case of the 5- year benchmark is 
that another period of somewhat larger spread can be observed for an interval in 
August 2002.  This coincides with the initial launch of the data product among Cantor 
customers.  The increase in the effective spread at the 3
rd quartile is only one crude 
measure of the effects of a fairly mild transparency event.  We find it to be a 
surprising effect given how liquid these markets are.   
 
MTS data are currently available through Reuters and Traderforce, but to our 
knowledge they are not as detailed, as widely distributed, as widely used or as user 
friendly as the data product produced and distributed by Cantor.   In one important 
respect the MTS data are not quite as useful for buy-side participants as are Cantor’s,  
because they are  not from as liquid a market.  Their distribution may be expected to 
have  less impact on buy-side requests for quotes, and this in turn would lead to fewer 
knock-on effects for inter-dealer activity.  If all limit-orders in the European context 
were to be consolidated and distributed in real-time to buy-side participants, then this 
might have more decisive effects.   In essence, what buy-side participants gain from 
inter-dealer market information has much to do with the information that they 
themselves supply to dealers.  If they receive more information, and this affects what 
they supply, then there is a circularity in this effect that could lead to very inefficient 
outcomes.  Ultimately some degree of opacity is needed if dealers are to be 
encouraged to supply both liquidity services and pre-trade information.   31
V Conclusion 
 
We investigate the effects of cross-country differences and changes over time in the 
level of transparency in sovereign bond markets. We take account of the specific 
microstructure characteristics of these markets, in particular the obligations on 
primary dealers and the issuance techniques chosen by sovereign issuers. We use data 
from the MTS markets for euro-denominated bonds and from the US Treasury 
market. There are significant differences across the euro-area countries in issuance 
techniques and the secondary market obligations that issuers impose on dealers. The 
US treasury market is closest to the German market although far larger. There our 
data permit comparisons across alternative trading platforms with differing degrees of 
transparency. 
 
Our empirical analysis uses simple (mainly non-parametric) descriptive statistics. We 
find a consistent and convincing pattern of results that correspond largely to our 
priors, which are b ased on both theory and extensive interviews with market 
participants.  
•  Across the MTS markets, countries that rely more on syndicate issuance and 
the placing of secondary market obligations on primary dealers have higher 
percentages of turnover on the (transparent) MTS. 
•  Where there is little or no reliance on the primary dealer system nor on 
syndicated issuance, there is little activity in the transparent secondary market 
(MTS). 
•  Examination of five liquidity-related variables is also revealing. Where 
transparency is high, trade size tends to be low. Where primary dealer 
obligations are greatest or where syndication is used heavily, we see better 
liquidity provision on MTS and low spreads. Effective spreads in the US are 
generally smaller than on MTS, except for the long benchmark. 
•  A detailed study of execution quality again shows it is closely related to the 
size of the issuer, the issuance techniques, and the obligations imposed on 
primary dealers.    32
•  We find evidence of a winner’s curse problem in both Europe and the US. 
These appear to be more prevalent in markets that are more transparent and 
less fragmented. 
•  We examine a ‘transparency event’ that occurred in June 2003 on the US 
Treasury market. The data suggest that a discrete increase in transparency on 
eSpeed brought an increase in effective spreads. 
 
We conclude dealers prefer to operate on more opaque markets.  While they respond 
to the obligations imposed by issuers by trading on the monitored platform this 
requires some distortion of the primary issuance process. The benefits of this system 
however are greater liquidity and market quality for the smaller countries’ bonds and 
this seems to benefit all of the major participants.  Greater transparency is associated 
with lower trade size and possibly with higher spreads.  The structure of the market as 
it becomes more electronic could pose problems for liquidity in the near future if it 
accentuates the winner’s curse or reduces the flow of information being 
communicated to dealers. Some degree of opacity seems necessary to induce dealers 
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Table 1.1 Outstanding Debt/Ratings (12/31/03) 
Issuer  Outstanding  Long-Term Ratings 
  (€,bln)  Moodys  S&P  Fitch 
Austria  146.4  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
Belgium  263.0  Aa1  AA+  AA 
Finland  63.3  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
France  787.7  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
Germany  773.8  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
Greece  148.3  A1  A+  A+ 
Ireland  28.1  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
Italy  1157.1  Aa2  AA  AA 
Netherlands  180.5  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
Portugal  78.4  Aa2  AA  AA 
Spain  309.0  Aaa  AA+  AAA 
Note: This table is reproduced from the MTS Handbook 2005 and it supplies input for the 
benchmark/non-benchmark breakdown that is contained in the country specific tables that follow.. 
 
Table 1.2 Austria, 8-Apr-05(€, millions) 
      Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
RAGB  15/07/06  5.875%  AT0000383518  6,404.1  208.98  3.26 
RAGB  20/10/07  5.50%  AT0000384953  8,749.5  470.83  5.38 
RAGB  15/01/08  5.00%  AT0000384227  8,140.1  138.08  1.7 
RAGB  15/07/09  4.00%  AT0000384821  8,725.8  638.82  7.32 
RAGB  15/01/10  5.50%  AT0000384938  8,810.0  824.68  9.36 
RAGB  04/01/11  5.25%  AT0000385067  8,267.2  231.79  2.8 
RAGB  20/10/13  3.80%  AT0000385992  9,482.3  328.88  3.47 
RAGB  15/07/14  4.30%  AT0000386073  8,002.1  209.51  2.62 
RAGB  15/01/18  4.65%  AT0000385745  9,771.4  145.22  1.49 
RAGB  15/07/20  3.90%  AT0000386115  5,650.0  274.18  4.85 
RAGB  15/07/27  6.25%  AT0000383864  6,581.1  123.18  1.87 
Benchmark        88,583.60  3594.15  4.06 
Non-Bench        57,816.40  469.48  0.81 
Total        146,400.00  4063.63  2.78 
Note: This table, and all of the country-specific tables, is derived from the MTS Handbook and from 
the month’s volume that we calculated from MTS data on transactions. In the cases of the individual 
bonds we calculated the volume traded for the month for which the amount outstanding was given and 
this produced the turnover percentage as well as providing a total that we regarded as a benchmark 
total. The individual bond turnover percentage should be very accurate. For both the amount 
outstanding and the volume traded we compiled a benchmark total and turnover percentage. For 
amount outstanding, we also arrive at a non-benchmark total by subtracting the benchmark amount 
from the total given in table 1.1 (this total is also repeated at the bottom of the country-specific tables 
in millions of euro). The same was done for the volume traded where we extracted total volume traded 
from the MTS data, took the benchmark amount from this to produce the non-benchmark total and 
turnover. Although the benchmark/non-benchmark division is not necessarily consistent by country, 
the turnover percentage is accurate. 
 
Table 1.3 Belgium, 30-June-04 (€, millions) 
  Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
5-yr:OLO323.75%  BE0000292012  16,463  760.96  4.62 
10-yr:OLO434.25%  BE0000303124  7,224  1,987.8  27.52 
15-yr:OLO405.50%  BE0000300096  7,627  3,033.64  39.78 
Benchmark    36,314  5,782.4  15.92 
Non-Benchmark    226,686  15,873.04  7 
Total    263,000  21655.44  8.23 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
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Table 1.4 Finland, 31-Dec-04 (€ millions) 
    Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
RFGB 2.75%  04-Jul-06  FI0001005514  7,110  998.57  14.04 
RFGB 5%  04-Jul-07  FI0001005332  6,221  1888.86  30.36 
RFGB 3%  May-08  F10001005522  5,999  -  - 
RFGB 5%  25-Apr-09  FI0001004822  5,653  934.05  16.52 
RFGB 5.75%  23-Feb-11  FI0001005167  5,673  2097.4  36.97 
RFGB 5.375%  4-Jul-13  FI0001005407  6,000  1319.15  21.99 
RFGB 4.25%  4-Jul-15  FI0001005704  5,000  1582.31  31.65 
Benchmark      41,656  8820.34  21.17 
Non-Benchmark      21644  1197.73  15.83 
Total      63,300  10018.07  5.53 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
Table 1.5 France, 15-Jun-04 (€, millions) 




BTAN  12/01/06  5.00%  FR0102626779  17,599  259.19  1.47 
BTAN  12/07/08  3.00%  FR0105760112  17,336  466.93  2.69 
OAT  25/10/13  4.00%  FR0010011130  17,422  379.59  2.18 
OAT  25/04/19  4.25%  FR0000189151  11,833  323.66  2.74 
OAT  25/10/32  5.75%  FR0000187635  18,738  108.24  0.58 
Benchmark        82,928  1537.61  1.85 
Non-Benchmark        704,772  17991.66  2.55 
Total        787,700  19529.27  2.48 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
Table 1.6 Germany, December 2004 (€, millions) 
    Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
2yr:BKO 2.25%  15/12/06  DE0001137081  14,000  159.55  1.14 
5yr:OBL 3.50%  09/10/06  DE0001141455  18,000  141.03  0.78 
10yr:DBR 3.75%  04/01/15  DE0001135267  16,000  601.85  3.76 
30yr:DBR 4.75%  04/07/34  DE0001135226  20,000  480.88  2.4 
Benchmark      68000  1383.31  2.03 
Non-Benchmark      705800  27798.64  3.94 
Total      773,800  29181.95  3.77 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
Table 1.7 Greece, 31-Dec-04 (€, millions) 
  Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
5Y5.95% 24-Mar-05  GR0114008338  6,785  181.65  2.68 
3Y4.65% 21-Jun-05  GR0110013159  6,375  80.99  1.27 
7Y6.00% 19-Feb-06  GR0118007559  6,996  297  4.25 
3Y2.75% 21-Jun-06  GR0110014165  7,391  313  4.23 
5Y4.65% 19-Apr-07  GR0114012371  7,500  141.45  1.89 
3Y3.25% 21-Jun-07  GR0110015170  8,363  1407.27  16.83 
5Y3.50% 18-Apr-08  GR0114015408  9,050  511.23  5.65 
10Y6.30% 29-Jan-09  GR0124006405  6,787  592.85  8.74 
5Y3.50% 20-Apr-09  GR0114017420  9,307  681.11  7.32 
10Y6.00% 19-May-10  GR0124011454  8,486  843.54  9.94 
10Y5.35% 18-May-11  GR0124015497  6,670  450.94  6.76 
10Y5.25% 18-May-12  GR0124018525  8,060  935.62  11.61 
10Y4.60% 20-May-13  GR0124021552  8,526  1105.31  12.96 
15Y6.50% 11-Jan-14  GR0128002590  4,602  678.55  14.74 
10Y4.50% 20-May-14  GR0124024580  8,523  1464.04  17.18 
20Y6.50% 22-Oct-19  GR0133001140  8,222  291.47  3.55 
20Y5.90% 22-Oct-22  GR0133002155  8,541  463.08  5.42 
Benchmark    130,184  10439.1  8.02   37
Non-Benchmark    18,116  535.23  2.95 
Total    148,300  10974.33  7.40 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
Table 1.8 Ireland, 30-Dec-2004 (€ millions) 
      Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
4.25%  Bond  2007  IE00031256211  6,086  -   
3.25%  Bond  2009  IE00032584868  5,043  -   
5.00%  Bond  2013  IE00031256328  6,106  -   
4.60%  Bond  2016  IE0006857530  5,791  156.03  2.69 
4.50%  Bond  2020  IE0034074488  5,729  149.61  2.61 
Benchmark        28,755  305.64  1.06 
Non-Benchmark        655  1434.04  218.94 
Total        28,100  1739.68  6.19 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
Table 1.9 Italy, 31-Dec-2003 (€, millions) 
    Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
3-yrBTP:  1-Sep-06  IT0003522254  13,775  5488.75  39.85 
3-yrBTP:  15-May-06  IT0003477111  15,100  4074.08  26.98 
3-yrBTP:  1-Feb-06  IT0003424485  16,060  4228.43  26.33 
5-yrBTP:  15-Sep-08  IT0003532097  7,700  2018.09  26.21 
5-yrBTP:  15-Jan-08  IT0003413892  15,970  1759.5  11.02 
5-yrBTP:  15-Oct-07  IT0003271019  16,351  1516.07  9.27 
10-yrBTP:  1-Aug-13  IT0003472336  18,410  6327.53  34.37 
10-yrBTP:  1-Feb-13  IT0003357982  17,943  3832.5  21.36 
10-yrBTP:  1-Feb-12  IT0003190912  23,468  2861.78  12.19 
15-yearBTP:  1-Feb-19  IT0003493258  13,940  595.28  4.27 
15-yearBTP:  1-Aug-17  IT0003242747  14,517  319.79  2.20 
30-yearBTP:  1-Aug-34  IT0003535157  7,000  719.52  10.28 
30-yearBTP:  1-Feb-33  IT0003256820  15,454  333.13  2.16 
30-yearBTP:  1-Nov-29  IT0001278511  22,478  183.26  0.82 
Benchmark      218,166  34257.71  15.70 
Non-Benchmark      938,934  98,648  10.51 
Total      1,157,100  132905.6  11.49 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
Table 1.10 Netherlands, 31-Jan-05 (€, millions) 
    Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
DSL 3.00%  15-Jul-07  NL0000102119  12,216  772.24  6.32 
DSL 2.50%  15-Jan-08  NL0000102150  2,645  435.84  16.48 
DSL 2.75%  15-Jan-09  NL0000102101  10,366  74.75  0.72 
DSL 3.00%  15-Jan-10  NL0000102309  6,327  309.79  4.90 
DSL 4.25%  15-Jul-13  NL0000102689  14,223  264.5  1.86 
DSL 3.75%  15-Jul-14  NL0000102325  11,710  318.49  2.72 
DSL 5.50%  15-Jan-28  NL0000102317  8,887  33.23  0.37 
Benchmark      66,374  2208.84  3.33 
Non-Benchmark      114,126  8,132  7.13 
Total      180,500  10340.65  5.73 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
 
Table 1.11 Portugal, 31-Dec-04 (€, millions) 
    Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
2-yr:OT 3.00%  Jul 2006  PTOTEWOE0009  5,072  2787.57  54.96 
3-yr:OT 4.875%  Aug 2007  PTOTEXOE0016  5,117  2501.1  48.88 
4-yr:OT 3.25%  July 2008  PTOTE2OE0000  4,200  630.04  15.00 
5-yr:OT 3.95%  July 2009  PTOTECOE0011  5,000  458.63  9.17   38
6-yr:OT 5.85%  May 2010  PTOTEHOE0008  5,147  969.64  18.84 
7-yr:OT 5.15%  June 2011  PTOTEJOE0006  5,258  1194.29  22.71 
8-yr:OT 5.00%  June 2012  PTOTEKOE0003  5,036  359.45  7.14 
9-yr:OT 5.45%  Sep 2013  PTOTEGOE0009  5,043  904.34  17.93 
10-yr:OT 4.375%  Jun 2014  PTOTE1OE0019  5,000  767.23  15.34 
Benchmark      44,873  10572.29  23.56 
Non-Benchmark 
(inc bills) 
    33,527  1,876  5.60 
Total      78,400  12448.22  15.88 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
 
Table 1.12 Spain, 31 Dec 2004 (€, millions) 
    Security ISIN  Outstanding  MTS Volume  Turnover % 
Bono 3.25  01/31/05  ES0000012254  8,553.15  30.05  0.35 
Bono 4.95  07/30/05  ES0000012379  11,967.94  284.68  2.38 
Bono 3.20  01/31/06  ES0000012841  11,314.37  358.64  3.17 
Bono 4.80  10/31/06  ES0000012445  11,307.16  370.41  3.28 
Bono 3.00  07/30/07  ES0000012908  7,765.18  1127.57  14.52 
Bono 4.25  10/31/07  ES0000012825  12,560.36  1214.41  9.67 
Bono 3.60  01/31/09  ES0000012882  11,446.80  955.72  8.35 
Obligaciones 6.00  01/31/08  ES0000011652  17,089.06  634.51  3.71 
Obligaciones 5.15  07/30/09  ES0000012064  12,572.29  229.47  1.83 
Obligaciones 4.00  01/31/10  ES0000012239  12,494.60  645.02  5.16 
Obligaciones 5.40  07/30/11  ES0000012387  13,195.10  635.68  4.82 
Obligaciones 5.35  10/31/11  ES0000012452  12,612.08  426.84  3.38 
Obligaciones 5.00  07/30/12  ES0000012791  12,873.20  574.98  4.47 
Obligaciones 6.15  01/31/13  ES0000011660  11,964.02  680.29  5.69 
Obligaciones 4.20  07/30/13  ES0000012866  10,241.79  346.27  3.38 
Obligaciones 4.75  07/30/14  ES0000012098  11,185.99  965.19  8.63 
Obligaciones 4.40  01/31/15  ES0000012916  9,184.50  1483.83  16.16 
Obligaciones 5.50  07/30/17  ES0000012783  13,793.87  847.56  6.14 
Obligaciones 6.00  01/31/29  ES0000011868  12,193.27  70.24  0.58 
Obligaciones 5.75  07/30/32  ES0000012411  11,600.09  254.87  2.20 
Benchmark      272,902.62  12136.23  4.45 
Non-Benchmark      36,097.38  3,207.19  8.88 
Total      309,000  15343.42  4.97 
Note: The note on table 1.2 applies here too. 
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Table 2.1. Short Maturity. Panels A & B. 
Panel A - Benchmark Issues 
Country  Effective Spread  Steepness  Trade Size  Best Liquidity  Total Liquidity 
  Median Q1  Q3  Median  Q1  Q3  Median  Q1  Q3  Median  Q1  Q3  Median  Q1  Q3 
AT  1.87  0  1.95  1.94  1.85  1.95  10  10  10  40  20  60  260  120  300 
BE  1.83  0  1.9  1.9  1.81  1.92  10  10  10  50  30  70  280  60  290 
DE  1.91  0  1.99  1.98    1.98  10  5  10  30  20  65  150  140  140 
ES  0  0  1.96  1.96  1.89  1.97  10  10  10  60  30  90  310  60  320 
FI  1.87  0  1.99  1.98  1.86  1.99  10  10  10  50  30  80  300  60  310 
FR  1.92  0  2.01  1.95  0  2.01  10  5  10  30  20  45  190  60  305 
GR  1.88  0  1.98  1.9  1.87  1.91  10  5  10  40  30  60  250  120  275 
IT  0  0  1.99  1.99  0.98  1.99  5  5  5  35  20  62.5  280  52.5  330 
NL  1.96  0  1.99  0.99  0.98  1  10  10  10  20  20  30  120  90  160 
PT  1.89  0  1.98  1.98  1.87  1.98  10  10  10  50  25  75  260  80  260 
US-BrokerTec  0.78  0.78  0.78  1.56  1.56  1.56  5  2  10  33  18  59  104  71  150 
US-eSpeed  0  0  2  2  1  2  5  2  16  123  62  192  549  371  693 
US-GovPX  0.79  0  0.79  N/A  N/A  N/A  5  5  20  30  12  52  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Panel B – Non-Benchmark Issues 
BE  1.7  0  1.83  1.83  1.69  1.83  5  5  10  30  15  45  160  55  170 
DE  1.89  1.81  2  1.89  1.81  1.91  10  5  10  30  20  50  175  50  190 
ES  2.06  1.92  3.84  1.93  1.92  1.92  10  5  20  40  20  55  180  160  160 
FR  1.83  0  1.86  1.86  1.82  1.92  10  5  10  25  15  30  155  50  190 
GR  1.97  0  1.98  1.98  1.98  1.98  5  5  10  35  20  60  230  170  255 
IT  0  0  1.91  1.78  0  1.98  2.5  2.5  2.5  20  7.5  37.5  117.5  27.5  170 
NL  1.85  0  1.88  0.92  0  0.94  10  10  10  20  20  30  105  60  115 
Freddie-Mac  1.91  0  1.91  1.91  1.9  1.91  10  10  10  50  30  80  340  160  360 
US-GovPX  0.39  0  0.39  N/A  N/A  N/A  5  5  20  10  10  15  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Notes for Table 2.1: The various measures given are for April and May 2004 in the case of the MTS data, for July 2004 in the case of BrokerTec 
data, for April 2005 in the case of eSpeed data and for April 2004 in the case of GovPX data. The effective spread is measured as twice the 
difference between the transaction price and the mid-quote immediately preceding the transaction expressed as a percentage of the mid-quote   40
(we multiply this by 100 to show it in basis points terms). The steepness is the average of steepness on each side of the orderbook. We measure 
steepness on each side as the difference between the 3rd worst bid/offer and the best bid/offer expressed as a percentage of the mid-point between 
these (we multiply this by 100 to show it in basis points terms). Trade size is based on the nominal volume being traded where transaction 
volume is based on a consolidated volume if trades are recorded at precisely the same time. Best liquidity is based on the average of the quoted 
size at the best bid and offer where we only consider the quotes immediately preceding the transactions. Total liquidity is based on the average 
of the total amount offered and the total amount bid in the best three quotes where we only include the quotes immediately preceding the trades.   41
Table 2.2. Medium Maturity. Panels A & B. The notes for Table 2.1., also apply to this table. 
Panel A - Benchmark Issues 
Country  Effective Spread  Steepness  Trade Size  Best Liquidity  Total Liquidity 
AT  1.84  0  1.93  1.87  1.81  1.94  10  10  10  30  20  50  205  110  240 
BE  2.02  2.01  2.02  2.02  2  2.02  10  10  10  50  30  90  310  80  350 
DE  1.91  0  2  2  1.91  2  10  5  10  25  20  50  200  45  210 
ES  1.92  0  1.95  1.95  1.9  1.96  10  10  10  40  25  75  280  60  310 
FI  1.86  0  2.01  1.87  1.86  2.01  10  10  10  40  20  50  260  130  290 
FR  1.97  0  1.99  1.99  1.95  1.99  10  10  10  35  20  60  250  60  305 
GR  1.78  0  1.99  1.97  1.77  1.98  10  5  10  30  20  55  220  115  255 
IE  2.01  1.92  3.98  2.01  1.91  2.01  10  10  10  20  20  30  115  60  115 
IT  1.97  0  2.03  1.99  1.97  2.04  5  5  10  35  20  60  260  102.5  345 
NL  2.05  2.04  2.05  2.05  2.04  2.05  10  10  10  30  20  55  200  70  200 
PT  1.95  1.95  1.95  1.95  1.95  1.95  10  10  10  35  20  50  235  135  255 
US-BrokerTec  0.78  0.77  0.79  1.58  1.57  2.36  2  1  5  19  10  33  73  52  101 
US-eSpeed  0  0  2.01  2.01  1.01  2.02  3  1  8  40  21  64  246  147  316 
US-GovPX  1.59  0.79  5.53  N/A  N/A  N/A  3  2  5  8  3  10  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Panel B – Non-Benchmark Issues 
BE  1.79  0  1.82  1.8  1.71  1.82  5  5  10  30  20  45  155  75  170 
DE  2  1.84  3.99  1.99  1.79  1.99  10  10  10  30  20  40  180  50  200 
ES  1.81  0  1.85  1.81  1.79  1.81  10  10  10  20  10  40  250  62.5  262.5 
FR  3.7  1.81  5.52  1.99  1.64  2.97  5  5  10  15  10  20  65  30  90 
GR  0  0    2.51      5  5    20  20    60     
HU  3.95  1.99  5.96  2.95  1.99  2.99  1  1  1  3  2  5  10  9  13 
IT  1.87  0  1.98  1.98  1.87  1.98  2.5  2.5  2.5  30  20  40  127.5  62.5  147.5 
NL  1.96  0  3.58  1.98  1.79  1.98  10  10  10  30  20  40  132.5  80  132.5 
PL  3.98  1.99  5.96  2.98  1.98  3.97  1  1  1  3  2  4  10  8  12 
PT  1.78  0  1.84  1.79  1.76  1.79  10  10  10  40  30  70  225  55  240 
Freddie-Mac  1.98  1.96  3.92  1.98  1.96  1.98  10  10  10  30  20  40  270  180  330 
US-GovPX  0.38  0  0.76  N/A  N/A  N/A  5  5  20  10  10  10  N/A  N/A  N/A   42
Table 2.3. Long Maturity. Panels A & B. The notes for Table 2.1., also apply to this table. 
Panel A - Benchmark Issues 
Country  Effective Spread  Steepness  Trade Size  Best Liquidity  Total Liquidity 
AT  1.85  0  2.05  1.87  1.84  2.06  10  5  10  25  20  40  140  85  150 
BE  1.96  0  2.01  1.99  1.87  2  10  10  10  30  20  45  200  125  250 
DE  1.93  0  3.73  1.97  1.86  1.97  10  5  10  20  15  30  140  40  140 
ES  1.83  0  1.99  1.87  1.81  1.92  10  10  10  30  20  50  215  110  260 
FI  1.8  0  1.83  1.83  1.79  1.83  10  10  10  30  20  40  180  110  210 
FR  2.01  0  3.76  2.02  1.84  2.02  10  5  10  25  20  40  180  40  210 
GR  1.84  0  1.98  1.97  1.84  1.98  5  5  10  30  20  45  170  110  190 
IE  1.95  1.88  5.63  2.82  1.85  2.82  10  10  10  20  15  40  85  70  85 
IT  1.9  0  2  1.99  1.87  2.01  5  5  10  37.5  20  55  260  170  305 
LU  4.2  1.83  6.25  2.09  1.81  2.71  10  10  10  30  20  50  140  100  160 
NL  1.98  0  3.73  1.99  1.86  2.09  10  5  10  20  20  40  150  70  190 
PT  1.98  1.82  3.69  1.87  1.8  1.98  10  10  10  30  20  50  200  60  220 
US-BrokerTec  1.53  1.52  1.54  3.07  3.06  3.1  2  1  4  17  10  29  76  56  103 
US-eSpeed  2.08  2.07  2.08  3.12  3.11  3.13  3  1  8  32  19  54  181  106  265 
US-GovPX  3.23  3.18  6.44  N/A  N/A  N/A  3  1  5  4  2  15  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Panel B – Non-Benchmark Issues 
AT  1.98  0  2  1.99  1.98  2.95  10  10  10  30  20  35  120  90  145 
BE  1.56  1.5  4.51  2.25  1.5  4.51  5  5  5  15  12.5  20  70  30  90 
DE  3.68  1.84  5.53  1.89  1.81  2.05  10  5  10  20  20  35  130  40  170 
ES  5.19  0  9.24  2.03  1.71  2.03  10  10  10  20  18  40  175  47  185 
FR  1.82  1.71  7.27  1.81  1.69  1.9  7.5  5  10  20  10  30  125  22.5  155 
HU  5.97  3.92  9.74  3.93  1.98  4.96  1  1  1  2  2  3  8  6  9 
IT  1.98  0  1.98  1.98  1.96  1.98  2.5  2.5  5  30  20  40  97.5  15  110 
LT  7.87  1.97  9.89  4.95  3.94  7.87  1  1  1  2  2  3  8  7  9 
PL  5.57  3.71  7.99  3.01  2  4.02  1  1  1  2  2  2  8  6  9 
Freddie-Mac  3.99  3.87  6.01  1.94  1.93  2  10  10  10  30  20  40  200  100  220 
US-GovPX  1.48  0.74  1.48  N/A  N/A  N/A  5  5  11  10  10  10  N/A  N/A  N/A   43
Table 2.4. Very Long Maturity. Panels A & B. The notes for Table 2.1., also apply to this table. 
Panel A - Benchmark Issues 
Country  Effective Spread  Steepness  Trade Size  Best Liquidity  Total Liquidity 
AT  5.89  1.96  8.25  2.95  1.96  3.93  5  5  5  10  10  15  40  35  50 
BE  7.37  3.66  11.01  3.7  2.75  7.33  5  5  5  10  10  15  55  32.5  70 
DE  8.11  6.09  12.17  2.04  2  3.6  2.5  2.5  5  10  7.5  15  50  32.5  60 
ES  7.1  5.22  8.85  2.66  1.77  2.67  5  5  5  10  10  15  55  40  65 
FR  4.08  2.07  8.14  2.07  2.06  3.11  5  5  5  12.5  10  15  70  47.5  95 
GR  3.35  1.68  5.33  2.69  1.68  3.57  5  5  5  10  10  15  50  35  55 
IT  4.01  2.03  5.39  2.08  2.02  3.03  2.5  2.5  5  10  7.5  12.5  42.5  32.5  60 
NL  10.82  7.35  11.07  2.74  1.81  3.68  5  5  5  10  10  20  50  45  65 
US-BrokerTec  1.55  1.53  3.1  4.57  3.06  6.1  2  1  3  8  5  12  27  21  34 
US-eSpeed  1.83  1.82  3.65  2.75  2.75  3.68  1  1  2  5  3  9  38  23  53 
Panel B – Non-Benchmark Issues 
DE  11.31  9.76  13.98  4.07  4  5.7  2.5  2.5  5  7.5  7.5  12.5  30  22.5  32.5 
ES  8.62  5.19  20.37  5.18  5.1  5.18  5  5  5  10  10  20  45  45  50 
FR  8.53  2.76  17.48  8.23  2.06  10.8  2.5  2.5  5  7.5  5  10  20  15  25 
IE  2.04  0  6.11  7.13  4.04  8.15  5  5  10  15  10  15  40  40  65 
IT  3.91  1.9  7.69  2.61  1.74  3.3  2.5  2.5  5  7.5  5  10  32.5  22.5  37.5 
NL  5.94  0  8.9  2.97  1.48  5.22  5  5  5  10  10  10  40  35  50 
   44






Low Execution Quality & 
Trade Size in Highest Quartile 
Low Execution Quality & 
Size at Best in Lowest Quartile 
Low Execution Quality & 
Steepness in Highest Quartile 
AT  68  16%  9%  15% 
BE  264  5%  7%  8% 
DE  179  4%  9%  5% 
ES  307  11%  9%  8% 
FI  179  17%  3%  11% 
FR  204  10%  6%  5% 
GR  232  2%  8%  11% 
IT  2343  10%  3%  12% 
NL  100  1%  5%  4% 
PT  270  2%  7%  5% 
US-BrokerTec  9204  7%  7%  0% 
US-eSpeed  860  4%  1%  3% 
US-GovPX  805  22%  7%  6% 
Notes for Table 3.1.: Low execution quality is defined as trades that occur at effective spreads that are in their highest quartile by size. Likewise, 
trade size is considered large if in the highest quartile. Size at best in lowest quartile represents a situation where the average size available at 
the best bid and ask quotes is relatively low and price impact for a large trade would be expected to be high. The steepness measure is described 
in the notes to table 2.1. When this is in its highest quartile we regard it as an unfavourable time to be executing large trades.   45






Low Execution Quality & 
Trade Size in Highest Quartile 
Low Execution Quality & 
Size at Best in Lowest Quartile 
Low Execution Quality & 
Steepness in Highest Quartile 
AT  96  4%  7%  10% 
BE  128  9%  5%  8% 
DE  71  7%  4%  10% 
ES  279  12%  4%  6% 
FI  122  10%  7%  8% 
FR  110  1%  8%  7% 
GR  346  5%  8%  12% 
IT  1266  6%  7%  11% 
NL  51  6%  2%  6% 
PT  51  6%  4%  4% 
US-BrokerTec  21012  6%  8%  1% 
US-eSpeed  1771  5%  2%  5% 
US-GovPX  151  32%  7%  14% 
Table 3.1. notes also apply to this table.   46






Low Execution Quality & 
Trade Size in Highest Quartile 
Low Execution Quality & 
Size at Best in Lowest Quartile 
Low Execution Quality & 
Steepness in Highest Quartile 
AT  70  7%  3%  4% 
BE  377  8%  6%  7% 
DE  108  4%  5%  5% 
ES  323  11%  7%  5% 
FI  86  8%  3%  9% 
FR  203  7%  5%  3% 
GR  675  8%  7%  9% 
IT  2347  6%  7%  16% 
NL  82  5%  6%  4% 
PT  254  9%  2%  3% 
US-BrokerTec  20211  7%  7%  1% 
US-eSpeed  2428  3%  6%  8% 
US-GovPX  78  31%  0%  4% 
Table 3.1. notes also apply to this table. 
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Table 4.1 Short Maturity, Benchmark Issues. Analysis of Winner’s Curse. 
Panel A. Limit orderbook activity in advance of seller initiated transactions 
Country  Sells  Rise in Bid Size  Rise in Ask Size 
Rise in Ask Size & 
Negative Return 
Rise in Ask Size & 
Positive Return 
AT  21  -  10%  5%  5% 
BE  102  1%  11%  8%  1% 
DE  68  6%  15%  6%  1% 
ES  123  16%  16%  7%  4% 
FI  46  22%  28%  13%  7% 
FR  60  3%  3%  2%  2% 
GR  82  -  2%  2%  - 
IT  1148  9%  6%  2%  1% 
NL  15  -  13%  13%  - 
PT  85  20%  19%  7%  4% 
US-BrokerTec  1778  23%  33%  10%  4% 
US-eSpeed  208  10%  13%  4%  - 
Panel B. Limit orderbook activity in advance of buyer initiated transactions 
  Buys  Rise in Bid Size  Rise in Ask Size 
Rise in Bid Size & 
Positive Return 
Rise in Bid Size & 
Negative Return 
AT  23  4%  -  4%  - 
BE  79  19%  4%  9%  8% 
DE  57  30%  7%  14%  9% 
ES  91  26%  10%  5%  12% 
FI  88  35%  19%  13%  11% 
FR  49  6%  8%  4%  2% 
GR  87  -  1%  -  - 
IT  1218  13%  5%  5%  2% 
NL  29  7%  7%  7%  - 
PT  114  30%  17%  13%  5% 
US-BrokerTec  1773  29%  24%  9%  3% 
US-eSpeed  201  16%  9%  6%  - 
 
Notes for Table 4.1. The Proportion of trades for which there was a rise in bid or ask size, 
refers to the proportion of transaction where a change in quantity bid or offered occurred 
and no change in the quoted price occurred. The change in quoted size usually precedes 
the transaction by a matter of seconds. The number of buys and sells provided are the 
number of transaction that this refers to (other transaction may have occurred but will not 
have had a constant price over the preceding quotes). The last two columns display the 
proportions of these trades that are also followed by a positive/negative return where the 
return is based on mid-quote returns between the current transaction and the following 
transaction. We base our analysis on comparisons of the second and third columns and 
also of the fourth and fifth columns. For sells/buys we would expect ask/bid size to 
increase just before the transaction. If there is information in the limit orders we would 
expect a rise in ask/bid size to more often precede negative/positive returns. Differences  
that are statistically significant at a 90% level are shown in bold. 
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Table 4.2 Medium Maturity, Benchmark Issues, Analysis of Winner’s Curse. 
Panel A. Limit orderbook activity in advance of seller initiated transactions 
Country  Sells  Rise in Bid Size  Rise in Ask Size 
Rise in Ask Size & 
Negative Return 
Rise in Ask Size & 
Positive Return 
BE  28  4%  11%  7%  - 
DE  28  4%  14%  7%  4% 
ES  59  7%  29%  10%  10% 
FI  34  6%  3%  3%  - 
FR  41  12%  5%  2%  - 
GR  118  -  -  -  - 
IT  365  10%  23%  10%  6% 
NL  6  -  17%  17%  - 
PT  11  27%  45%  27%  - 
US-BrokerTec  3332  18%  29%  10%  4% 
US-eSpeed  493  6%  17%  7%  - 
Panel B. Limit orderbook activity in advance of buyer initiated transactions 
  Buys  Rise in Bid Size  Rise in Ask Size 
Rise in Bid Size & 
Positive Return 
Rise in Bid Size & 
Negative Return 
BE  52  25%  2%  8%  13% 
DE  32  13%  13%  -  6% 
ES  108  12%  6%  6%  6% 
FI  40  3%  5%  3%  - 
FR  21  -  5%  -  - 
GR  115  2%  1%  1%  1% 
IT  523  19%  12%  8%  4% 
LU  59  2%  2%  2%  - 
NL  14  21%  -  14%  7% 
PT  11  18%  36%  9%  - 
US-BrokerTec  3297  27%  19%  10%  3% 
US-eSpeed  454  15%  4%  6%  - 
Notes for Table 4.1. also apply to this table.   50
Table 4.3 Long Maturity, Benchmark Issues, Analysis of Winner’s Curse. 
Panel A. Limit orderbook activity in advance of seller initiated transactions 
Country  Sells  Rise in Bid Size  Rise in Ask Size 
Rise in Ask Size & 
Negative Return 
Rise in Ask Size & 
Positive Return 
BE  78  5%  4%  4%  - 
DE  45  4%  2%  2%  - 
ES  55  13%  9%  4%  4% 
FI  24  8%  -  -  - 
FR  36  17%  11%  8%  3% 
GR  292  1%  4%  1%  2% 
IT  945  15%  25%  12%  6% 
NL  12  -  -  -  - 
PT  39  8%  15%  3%  13% 
US-BrokerTec  3344  18%  31%  12%  4% 
US-eSpeed  621  7%  14%  6%  1% 
Panel B. Limit orderbook activity in advance of buyer initiated transactions 
  Buys  Rise in Bid Size  Rise in Ask Size 
Rise in Bid Size & 
Positive Return 
Rise in Bid Size & 
Negative Return 
BE  155  2%  3%  2%  - 
DE  22  -  -  -  - 
ES  139  12%  5%  5%  4% 
FI  39  13%  8%  5%  5% 
FR  54  19%  4%  11%  4% 
GR  281  1%  2%  -  1% 
IT  1171  24%  18%  13%  6% 
NL  18  6%  -  -  - 
PT  93  14%  19%  4%  9% 
US-BrokerTec  3281  32%  21%  12%  4% 
US-eSpeed  761  14%  9%  4%  - 
 
Notes for Table 4.1. also apply to this table.   51
Figure 1.1. 




























































































































































































































Notes for Figure 5.1. The 3rd quartile effective spread is based on transactions that are no-
more than one minute apart and usually only a few seconds apart. Pre-transaction quotes 
were not available so the last seller- and buyer-initiated transactions in each minute were 
used to estimate the effective spread. The daily 3 rd quartile of this is plotted for each EST 
day between 9.00am and 5.30pm. All trading days for 2003 are included but for years 
2002, 2004 and 2005 we only show the daily 3 rd quartile within the months of April, June 
and August. The event of interest occurred on 13 June 2003 and it is noticeable that this is 
soon followed by a larger 3rd quartile spread. 
 
Figure 1.2. 






















































































































































 The notes for figure 5.1. also apply to this table. 
 
 